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ABSTRACT
Background. Assessment of capacity plays a pivotal role in determining when decisions need to be
made on behalf of an individual. It therefore has major clinical management implications for health
care professionals and civil liberties implications for the person concerned. In many countries, there
is a presumption that adults have the capacity to make health care decisions. However, in persons
with a mental disability, capacity may be temporarily or permanently impaired.
Methods. A selective review is presented which considers : (i) the broad approaches taken to
determining capacity; (ii) the abilities commonly assessed in determining capacity; and (iii) the
principles underlying health care decision-making for adults who are without capacity.
Results. Capacity is a functional concept, determined by the person’s ability to understand, retain,
and weigh up information relevant to the decision in order to arrive at a choice, and then to
communicate that choice. We have reviewed the studies that examined decision-making abilities in
people with dementia, chronic mental illness or intellectual disabilities. Approaches to decision-
making in adults who lack capacity include: anticipatory decisions made through advance health
care statements or decisions by proxy based on ‘best interests ’ or ‘substituted judgement’.
Conclusions. The understanding of clinical and legal aspects of capacity is still developing. This
paper examines current concepts of capacity and decision-making on behalf of those without
capacity. We propose a framework, in line with current ethical and legal guidelines, as an aid to
clinicians when they are seeking consent for a health care intervention.
INTRODUCTION
A basic legal and ethical principle in democratic
countries is that adults have the right to make
decisions affecting their own lives. However, this
right to self-determination is only meaningful if
the person is appropriately informed, is free to
make decisions without coercion and has the
ability or ‘capacity’ to make the decision. Where
an individual may not have capacity, there may
exist both a difficult ethical dilemma between
respect for autonomy and the individual’s need
for care and protection from harm, and un-
certainty as to an appropriate and legal course
of action.
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In mental health services and in services for
people with intellectual disabilities or with
traumatic or progressive disorders of the brain,
the issue of capacity is particularly salient. A
priori, the difficulties involving thought, affect
and cognition, which characterize and are associ-
ated with such serious mental disabilities, seem
likely to impair some of the abilities required
for autonomous decision-making (Freedman
et al. 1991; Marson et al. 1994; Appelbaum
& Grisso, 1995; Jones, 1995; Murphy & Clare,
1995; Brabbins et al. 1996). It is, therefore,
important that psychiatrists and other mental
health professionals are familiar with concepts
of capacity and its evaluation, not only for their
own clinical practice, but also when providing
advice to medical or surgical colleagues, and as
expert witnesses in court.
Different legal jurisdictions may approach
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issues surrounding capacity in different ways.
However, ethical difficulties in relation to de-
cision-making among people whose abilities are
impaired are universally relevant. Although the
capacity to make decisions is central to most
aspects of life, in this paper we focus on one
particular area: capacity to give or withhold
consent to health care interventions. The fol-
lowing issues are considered: (i) the broad
approaches taken to determining capacity in
adults ; (ii) the abilities commonly assessed in
determining capacity; and (iii) the principles
underlying health care decision-making for
adults who are without capacity. While reference
is made to a number of jurisdictions, there is a
particular focus on England and Wales where
reform of the current law has been advocated
and is being considered (Law Commission, 1995;
Lord Chancellor’s Department, 1997). We con-
clude by presenting a framework that will aid
clinicians in assessing capacity and seeking
consent in an ethically and legally defensible
manner.
THE RELEVANCE OF CAPACITY
Issues relating to decision-making capacity are
becoming increasingly important in mental
health practice, not just for ethical and legal
reasons, but also because of demographic and
social changes. In most developed countries,
including the United Kingdom, the population
of older people is expanding (United Nations,
1979; Harris, 1997). Since the risk of dementia
increases exponentially with age (Kay, 1991), it
is expected that there will be an increase in the
prevalence of dementia. At the same time,
accompanying social policies of de-institutional-
ization and care in the community (for example,
in England and Wales, the National Health
Service and Community Care Act 1990 ) have
enabled a large number of people with mental
disabilities to be resettled from hospital (Audit
Commission, 1994; Mansell, 1997), thus po-
tentially increasing the opportunities and scope
for decision-making. Moreover, policies that
foster the empowerment of disadvantaged per-
sons (for example, United Nations, 1994) are
increasingly being adopted. An important policy
objective is to enable or encourage such persons
to exercise their capacity to the greatest extent
possible. Where decisions need to be made for
an individual, the emphasis is on adopting the
least restrictive alternative taking into account,
where possible, the person’s previously expressed
preferences. These principles are expressed in
mental health and disability law in most de-
veloped countries (a full list of statutes embody-
ing these principles is given in Creyke, 1995;
Law Commission (England and Wales), 1995,
para. 2.46; Scottish Law Commission, 1995,
paras. 1.5 and 1.27).
In England and Wales, and in most other
common law jurisdictions, an adult is presumed
to have capacity to give or withhold consent
until proved otherwise. This right to autonomy
exists whether the reasons for making the choice
are rational, irrational, unknown, or even non-
existent, and regardless of whether the outcome
might be detrimental to the person (Re T (adult:
refusal of treatment) [1992] 4 All England Law
Reports, 649) or to a viable foetus (St George’s
Healthcare National Health Service Trust v S,
The Times Law Report, May 8, 1998). Based on
the principle that every person’s body is invio-
late, health care interventions, even if intended
for the individual’s benefit, which are carried out
without his or her consent may constitute a civil
or criminal offence of assault or battery.
Nevertheless, the general presumption of
capacity is refutable. An adult may be without
capacity through a life-long mental disability,
such as an intellectual disability. Capacity may
have been attained but lost through trauma or
the onset of dementia, or may fluctuate as the
result of temporary factors, such as acute mental
illness, unconsciousness, confusion, or the effects
of fatigue, pain or drugs.
WHAT IS CAPACITY?
Approaches to determining capacity
Capacity is the pivotal issue in balancing the
right to freedom of decision-making and the
right to protection from harm. It distinguishes
the person who is capable of making a decision
and whose choice must, therefore, be respected,
from one who requires others to make decisions
for him or her. It is a major challenge to set a
threshold for capacity that is neither so low as to
fail to offer adequate protection to those who
are vulnerable nor so high that it restricts the
right to self-determination of a person with
capacity. Much consideration has been given
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internationally to the approaches that might be
used to determine capacity (Roth et al. 1977;
President’s Commission, 1983; Weisstub, 1990;
Appelbaum & Grisso, 1995; Law Commission
1995; Scottish Law Commission, 1995; Verma
& Silberfeld, 1997). Three broad approaches
have been distinguished (President’s Commis-
sion, 1983; Weisstub, 1990; Hoggett, 1994).
These are :
1 Outcome
This approach uses the consequence of the
decision-making process as the criterion for
determining capacity. The implication is that an
individual who makes a decision that is contrary
to conventional wisdom or the opinion of the
treatment-provider is likely to be viewed as
being without capacity. Despite arguments that
it protects people from the consequences of
unsound decisions (Hoggett, 1994), this ap-
proach has been firmly rejected by case law in a
number of jurisdictions (see cases quoted in
Kennedy & Grubb, 1994, pp. 135–140) as it
gives little meaning to self-determination.
2 Status
In this approach, a person’s capacity is de-
termined by his or her membership of a specific
population. Assumptions are made about an
individual’s decision-making on the basis of
some characteristic, for example, chronological
age, estimated ‘mental age’ or psychiatric
diagnosis. This approach assumes, first, that a
group sharing a particular characteristic is
homogeneous and, secondly, that all decision-
making involves a similar level of demand upon
the decision-maker. Neither of these assump-
tions is supported empirically (Morris et al.
1993; Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995a ; Marson et
al. 1995a, b). In England and Wales, the status
approach has been rejected both in case law (Re
C (Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 All E.R. 819)
and by the Mental Health Act 1983 Code of
Practice (Department of Health and Welsh
Office, 1993).
3 Functional
In many jurisdictions, this approach has at-
tracted the most informed support (President’s
Commission, 1983; Weisstub, 1990; Law Com-
mission, 1995; Scottish Law Commission, 1995).
It is based on establishing the extent to which
the person’s understanding, knowledge, skills
and abilities meet the demands of the task in-
volved in making a particular decision within
a given legal context (Grisso, 1986). Capacity
is, therefore, decision-specific and time-specific,
rather than global or permanent. There are two
important implications.First, although evidence,
from standardized assessments, of abnormal
mental states or cognitive impairments is infor-
mative, it cannot, and should not, replace a
specific assessment of the person’s decision-
making abilities in relation to the particular
decision at issue (Marson et al. 1994; Grisso
& Appelbaum, 1998). Secondly, where it appears
that a person is without capacity, consideration
needs to be given to the possibility of im-
proving the relevant functional abilities. This
may be achieved by education (Chaplin & Kent,
1998), treatment of the underlying disorder
(Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995a) and}or by
simplifying the task through presenting treat-
ment information using: (a) simpler language
(Tymchuk et al. 1986) ; (b) illustrations (Hollins
et al. 1996) ; or (c) in small ‘chunks’, which
are more easily processed (Grisso & Appelbaum,
1995a).
A functional approach is, however, not with-
out problems. First, it is time-consuming since,
in theory, everyone should have a capacity as-
sessment each time they make a decision
(Hoggett, 1994). Secondly, legal standards for
capacity vary between jurisdictions and there is
so far no unanimous agreement on the abilities
that comprise capacity, let alone how these
might be assessed in practice (Grisso, 1986;
Gunn, 1994; Appelbaum & Grisso, 1995; Wong,
1997). Thirdly, there is uncertainty about the
threshold at which the discrepancy between the
decision-maker’s functional abilities and the
demands of the particular decision is deemed to
constitute incapacity. This ambiguity is perhaps
inevitable as individuals and societies hold
different views about the balance between the
conflicting interests of respect for autonomy and
protection of vulnerable people from harm.
It has been proposed that the three approaches
might be integrated. For example, an outcome
and functional approach may be combined in
‘sliding scale ’ models (Roth et al. 1977; Drane,
1984; Schwartz & Blank, 1986; Weisstub, 1990)
where the threshold for capacity depends on the
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complexity of the decision, the significance of
its outcome, or a combination of the two.
Despite its superficial attractiveness, it has been
argued that a sliding scale may simply miss the
point (Gunn, 1994). As the ‘desirability ’ of the
outcome of the decision and its ‘dangerousness ’
are often determined by the clinician, the focus
of capacity shifts away from the patient’s abilities
and values ; the approach may be too paternal-
istic (Glass, 1997). Moreover, determination of
the way in which, and by whom, the threshold
for capacity should be decided and the validity
of such multiple thresholds remain practical
hurdles.
An alternative proposal is that the status and
functional approaches are combined so that a
functional assessment is only carried out when a
person’s status places the presumption of ca-
pacity in doubt (Hoggett, 1994). Though con-
troversial (Carson, 1993), on the grounds that it
may be prejudicial to people with disabilities,
this combination of approaches has been pro-
posed, following extensive consultation, in both
England and Wales (Law Commission, 1995)
and Scotland (Scottish Law Commission, 1995).
Abilities relevant to capacity
The abilities that are relevant to decision-making
have been widely considered in both the clinical
(Roth et al. 1977; Grisso, 1986; Appelbaum &
Grisso, 1995; Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998) and
legal literature (Gunn, 1994; President’s Com-
mission; Law Commission, 1995; Scottish Law
Commission, 1995; Weisstub, 1990). Although a
universally accepted set of standards for capacity
remains elusive, there is now an emerging
consensus. The following abilities are most
commonly cited as relevant: (i) communicating
a choice ; (ii) understanding relevant informa-
tion; (iii) retaining the information; (iv) appreci-
ating the personal significance of treatment
information; (v) reasoning and rational manipu-
lation of information to arrive at a decision
(Appelbaum & Grisso, 1988; Weisstub, 1990;
Law Commission, 1995; Berg et al. 1996). Each
of these abilities, and its relevance to mental
health practice, will be examined in turn.
(i) Communicating a choice
This is the least stringent standard as it requires
only the ability to make a response about a
particular decision (Roth et al. 1977; Appelbaum
& Grisso, 1995; Law Commission, 1995). Diffi-
culties in communicating a choice may arise
from a wide variety of sources, for example,
extreme ambivalence, thought disorder, or
memory problems (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1988;
Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995a ; Marson et al.
1995b), impairments in verbal expression
(Benson & Ardila, 1996; Rapin, 1996), or in
mute or stuporose states.
The ability to communicate a choice is a
necessary, but not sufficient, standard of ca-
pacity. The mere expression of a choice does not
indicate whether consideration has been given to
issues such as the achievement of personal goals
and, by itself, may fail to provide adequate
protection for the well-being of vulnerable
persons. The Law Commission (1995), in its
proposed legislation, suggests an obligation on
treatment providers to take all practicable steps
to enable the person to communicate. Where
appropriate, these should include the use of
augmentative or alternative forms of communi-
cation (Kiernan, 1985; Beukelman & Mirenda,
1992; Ambalu, 1997).
(ii) Understanding information relevant to
the treatment
This standard is included in almost all concepts
of capacity across jurisdictions and is the least
controversial. Generally, the threshold for
achieving the standard is low. For health care
decisions, only an understanding, in ‘broad
terms’ and ‘simple language’, of the nature and
purpose of the treatment is required (Chatterton
v Gerson [1081] Queen’s Bench 432; Law
Commission, 1995, para 3.18), rather than any
detailed knowledge.
Studies using standardized disclosures have
demonstrated difficulties in understanding in-
formation about treatment among people with
mental disorders, primarily schizophrenia or
depression (Grossman & Summers, 1980; Irwin
et al. 1985; Schachter et al. 1994; Grisso &
Appelbaum, 1995a), dementia (Marson et al.
1995b) and intellectual disabilities (Morris et al.
1993), with an association between the severity
of the mental disability and the impairment of
understanding. However, the relevance or famil-
iarity of the material may be important. People
with schizophrenia or depression tend to dem-
onstrate better understanding of material re-
lating to their own diagnosis than to medical
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conditions which they have not experienced
(Grisso & Appelbaum, 1991).
(iii) Retaining relevant information
The Law Commission included an inability to
retain relevant information in their proposed
definition of incapacity. This standard is con-
troversial since neither the period during which
information should be retained nor the form in
which it should be retained has been specified. In
any case, the criterion may be redundant (Jones
& Keywood, 1996) on the grounds that, if
information is not retained, the person is unlikely
to be able to demonstrate understanding of the
relevant information; consequently, he or she
would then be deemed to lack capacity.
(iv) Manipulating information rationally
This refers to the ability to weigh the risks
and benefits of different options. It may be
impaired by various symptoms associated with
mental disorders, for example, delusions of
persecution or grandeur, as well as the concrete
thinking and problem-solving difficulties associ-
ated with intellectual disabilities or dementia
(Murphy & Clare, 1995). In common law, a
seemingly irrational choice is not, in itself,
indicative of incapacity. The introduction of a
‘rationality ’ standard has been viewed with
caution as standards of rationality are often
based on the subjective judgement of assessors
(Tancredi, 1982), and hence may allow a covert
adoption of the outcome approach. Conse-
quently, commentators emphasize that the stan-
dard should focus on the process by which the
individual reaches a decision (Appelbaum &
Grisso, 1988, 1995; Gunn, 1994), not its out-
come. Jones & Keywood (1996) argue that the
interpretation of this standard should be based
on whether the person’s decision was a ‘rational
product ’ of his or her underlying beliefs,
regardless of the unusualness or irrationality of
those beliefs. An alternative, more stringent,
standard is the possession of long-held beliefs
that are not the result of a temporary delusion
reflecting some current illness (The President’s
Commission, 1983; Kennedy, 1992).
Nevertheless, some practical and conceptual
problems remain. It is, for example, doubtful
whether the rationality of a decision-making
process can ever be assessed without consider-
ation of its outcome. Similarly, the period
required for beliefs to be considered long-
standing or stable has never been operation-
alized. Moreover, a focus on whether the
individual’s decision is congruent with his or her
underlying belief system ignores issues surround-
ing the social acceptability of the belief system
or whether such a system would be regarded
as pathological. As has been pointed out
(Kopelman, 1990), judgements about belief
systems are not value-free. In making assess-
ments, clinicians should be aware of their own
beliefs, and adopt a structured approach to
minimize the impact of their own value systems
(Law Commission, 1991, para. 2.44).
(v) Appreciating the situation and its likely
consequences
In making a health care decision, ‘appreciation’
differs from factual understanding. It requires
that the person recognizes that he or she has a
disorder to which the particular treatment may
apply. Difficulties in appreciation or lack of
insight are often considered to be core com-
ponents of the major psychiatric disorders
(Carpenter et al. 1976; Bursztajn et al. 1991;
Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995a). While such
problems may also affect people with dementia
and intellectual disabilities, they must be viewed
in the context of carers’ apparent reluctance
to provide information to people with these
diagnoses about their disorders (Goldsmith,
1996; Maguire et al. 1996; Todd & Shearn,
1997).
Though there is some consensus that the
above abilities are relevant to health care
decision-making, the ‘weighting’ to be given to
each standard remains uncertain. This is im-
portant as the use of different standards, or
combinations of standards, affects the identity
and proportion of persons who are without
capacity (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995b).
DECISION-MAKING FOR ADULTS WHO
DO NOT HAVE CAPACITY
Where an individual is without capacity, mech-
anisms need to be in place to ensure that he
or she is not deprived of necessary treatment.
There are three broad approaches to decision-
making for an adult who is unable to make a
particular health care decision: anticipatory
decision-making by the person him or herself in
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the form of advance health care statements, and
proxy decision-making by others, based on either
‘substituted judgement’ or ‘best interests ’.
Advance health care statements
Advance statements of health care are most
respectful of an individual’s right to self-
determination because they are direct expres-
sions of personal wishes. Provision for the legal
acceptance of both advance decisions about
health care and appointment of proxies is already
in place in many common law jurisdictions (for
example: Florida in the USA, Ontario and
Manitoba in Canada, Victoria in Australia ; for
details, see Kennedy & Grubb, 1994).
In England and Wales, informed advance
refusals of treatment are legally binding in
common law provided that they are made by a
person who has capacity to make that decision,
and are used in the circumstances that are
clearly specified in the advance refusal (Re C
[1994] see above; British Medical Association,
1995; Dormer, 1997). Recently, in both England
and Wales (Law Commission, 1995, Part V;
Lord Chancellor’s Department, 1997) and
Scotland (Scottish Law Commission, 1995,
para. 5.50), it has been proposed that the law
governing this area should be placed on a clear
statutory basis. Proposals to put advance re-
fusals on a statutory basis have aroused contro-
versy because of concerns about possible links
with the legalization of euthanasia. However, it
is clear that at present only advance refusals of
treatment are legally binding. Euthanasia, which
involves an intentional act to end a patient’s life,
remains unlawful (Lord Chancellor’s Depart-
ment, 1997).
The legality, in England and Wales, of other
forms of advance health care statements is less
clear. Anticipatory appointment of health care
proxies through a ‘continuing’ or ‘enduring’
power of attorney has no legal force in England
and Wales at present, but is being considered for
legislation (Law Commission, 1995, Part VII).
Meanwhile, there has been increasing interest in
the development of psychiatric advance direc-
tives or ‘crisis cards’ (Halpern & Szmukler,
1997; Sutherby & Szmukler, 1998). These are
drafted while the individual is clinically well
and provide instructions relating to the person’s
care in case of a relapse or crisis. While their use
is still restricted, and as yet they have no legal
force, their informal use, as an aid to self-
advocacy, is likely to become more common
(Department of Health, 1993).
Despite the advantages of advance health care
decisions, there are practical limitations. First,
anticipating the circumstances in which the
statement will be applied may be a demanding
task. Secondly, they cannot be used for adults
who may never develop the capacity to make
relevant decisions. Thirdly, public knowledge
about the possibility of making advance health
care decisions is at present limited, although this
can be changed relatively easily through edu-
cation.
Decision-making by proxy
Two general approaches have been adopted for
proxy decision-making: ‘best interests ’ and
‘substituted judgement’. The ‘best interests ’
approach is based on the ethical principle of
beneficence. The ‘substituted judgement’ ap-
proach requires the proxy to make a decision
which best reflects the person’s choice if he or
she had capacity.
In England and Wales, the ‘best interests ’ test
is favoured. At present, no person or court can
give consent to treatment of an adult who is
without capacity (for an analysis of the legal
background, see Law Commission, 1991, pp.
55–90). The only legal framework is that
provided by the common law doctrine of
necessity. The leading case is that of Re F
(Mental Patient: Sterilization) ([1990] 2 AC 1) in
which the House of Lords ruled that treatment
of an adult who is unable to make a health care
decision may be carried out if, in accordance
with a practice accepted at the time by a
responsible body of appropriately skilled medi-
cal opinion, it is necessary in the ‘best interests ’
of the person. This approach also permits other
action, such as the admission to hospital of a
person who lacks capacity to make this decision,
but is not objecting, without use of the Mental
Health Act 1983 (R v Bournewood Community
and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1998]
3 All E.R. 289).
More formal assessments of what constitutes
‘best interests ’ may be required when the
proposed intervention is neither a necessity nor
an emergency, and is particularly controversial.
Examples include the sterilization of women for
contraceptive reasons, organ donation, or any
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other non-therapeutic procedure. In such situa-
tions, the House of Lords has advised that it
would be good practice to seek a declaratory
judgement from the court on the legality of the
intervention.
The definition of ‘best interests ’ in Re F is
narrowly confined to the medical interests of
patients and is intended ‘to save their lives or to
ensure improvement or prevent deterioration in
their physical and mental health’ (Re F, per
Lord Brandon). There is now increasing support
for the view that ‘best interests ’ should en-
compass broader considerations such as the
previously expressed wishes of the individual,
the views of significant others, and the ‘ least
restrictive’ action (Law Commission, 1995,
paras. 3.25, 3.28), extending the approach to
include elements of ‘substituted judgement’.
There are also inherent difficulties for the
‘substituted judgement’ approach. It has been
suggested (Ouslander et al. 1989) that potential
proxies are poor predictors of the health care
decisions of people who may become mentally
incapacitated. For example, where adult children
have claimed to be able to represent a parent’s
views, their opinions are often based on vague
impressions, with a lack of agreement between
siblings (Sonnenblick et al. 1993). Moreover,
conflicts of interest may lead to some proxies
acting to serve their own motives.
Decision-making may be made through in-
formal proxies, such as family members or
carers, by proxies appointed by the patient
through a legal mechanism, by court-appointed
guardians, or by the court itself. It seems
appropriate to adopt a hierarchical approach in
which the severity of the implications of the
particular decision determines the level of
formality and regulation of proxy decision-
making. This is certainly the approach adopted
in many other democracies (for example Aus-
tralia : Creyke, 1995) and is currently under
consideration for Scotland (Scottish Law Com-
mission, 1995) and England and Wales (Law
Commission, 1995; Lord Chancellor’s Depart-
ment, 1997). While a consideration of the full
range of possible legal mechanisms is beyond
the scope of this paper, this broad framework
illustrates the challenge of achieving a balance
between the provision of adequate protection to
people without capacity and encumbering their
lives with restrictive legal provisions.
Exceptions to a capacity-based approach
While the autonomy of ‘capable ’ individuals is
a general rule in England and Wales, not all
health care legislation reflects a capacity-based
approach. Probably the most important ex-
ception to the general rule is the Mental Health
Act 1983, which provides a legal framework to
enable individuals to be detained in hospital for
the assessment and treatment of mental dis-
orders. With some exceptions, such as psycho-
surgery (s. 57), or the long-term administration
of medicine (s. 58), where the person’s consent
must be sought, the individual’s capacity to
give or withhold consent to such treatment is
ultimately irrelevant. The grounds for admission
to hospital under the Act are the patient’s health
needs or danger to himself or herself or danger
to others (s. 2), as judged bymedical practitioners
and approved social workers.
Similarly, a utilitarian rationale underlies the
public health legislation (e.g. the National
Assistance Act 1948 ; the Public Health (Control
of Diseases) Act 1984) authorizing a range
of interventions (for example, removal from
home, detention, and examination, though not
treatment) which do not require the individual’s
consent.
CONCLUSIONS
Capacity is of central importance in decision-
making about health care interventions. As this
review illustrates, however, when the presump-
tion of capacity may not, or cannot, be sustained,
important philosophical, legal, and practical
issues are raised to which there are no straight-
forward solutions. Each such case presents a
challenge because of the need to balance respect
for an individual’s autonomy and protection of
vulnerable members of society from harm.
In most cases, the health care practitioner
proposing a particular intervention is responsible
for determining whether the person has the
capacity to give or withhold consent to that
treatment. Given the difficulties outlined in this
review, how may this task best be achieved? In
Fig. 1, we present a framework to assist in the
process of making such assessments.
The framework, which provides general guid-
ance on treatment decisions and some other
legally-significant decisions, is intended to apply
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Trust
Fig. 1. An aid to clinicians in seeking consent to health care intervention: what is ethically and legally defensible?
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primarily to clinicians in England and Wales
(British Medical Association}The Law Society,
1995), but the general principles may be useful in
other jurisdictions if the local legal criteria for
capacity are addressed. Attention needs to be
paid to issues of good practice when consider-
ing treatment of an adult who does not have
capacity. Consideration should be given to views
of the person concerned even though he or she is
considered legally without capacity to determine
what happens. The person’s liberty, privacy and
dignity should be maintained as far as possible.
Whenever appropriate, the views of the person’s
significant others and the opinion of other
professionals should be sought. This is par-
ticularly important in the process of capacity
assessment and in maximizing capacity.
Since capacity is a legal construct, ultimately
it is for a court to decide whether or not an
individual is ‘capable ’ of making a particular
health care decision. However, the framework
presented here will, at least, enable clinicians to
make assessments which, if fully documented,
will be ethically, as well as legally, defensible.
This paper was written as the initial element of a
project on capacity to consent to treatment, funded
by the Nuffield Foundation; we are grateful for their
support. We would also like to thank Dr Tom Dening
and Dr Claire Lawton for their advice.
REFERENCES
Ambalu, S. (1997). Communication. In Adults with Intellectual
Disabilities. A Practical Approach for Health Professionals (ed. J.
O’Hara and A. Sperlinger), pp. 45–60. John Wiley & Sons:
Chichester.
Appelbaum, P. S. & Grisso, T. (1988). Assessing patient’s capacity to
consent to treatment. New England Journal of Medicine 319,
1635–1638.
Appelbaum, P. S. & Grisso, T. (1995). The MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study. I. Mental illness and competence to consent to
treatment. Law and Human Behavior 19, 105–126.
Audit Commission (1994). Finding a Place. A Review of Mental
Health Services for Adults. HMSO: London.
Benson, D. F. & Ardila, A. (1996). Aphasia. A Clinical Perspective.
Oxford University Press : New York.
Berg, J. W., Appelbaum, P. S. & Grisso, T. (1996). Constructing
competence: formulating standards of legal competence to make
medical decisions. Rutgers Law Review 48, 345–396.
Beukelman,D. R.&Mirenda, P. (1992).Augmentative andAlternative
Communication. Management of Severe Communication Disorders
in Children and Adults. Paul H. Brookes Publishing Co. : Baltimore.
Brabbins, C., Butler, J. & Bentall, R. (1996). Consent to neuroleptic
medication for schizophrenia: clinical, ethical and legal issues.
British Journal of Psychiatry 168, 540–544.
British Medical Association (1995). Code of Practice on Advance
Statements about Medical Treatment. British Medical Association:
London.
British Medical Association and The Law Society (1995). Assessment
of Mental Capacity. Guidance for Doctors and Lawyers. British
Medical Association: London.
Bursztajn, H. J., Harding, H. P., Gutheil, T. G. & Brodsky, A.
(1991). Beyond cognition: the role of disordered affective states
in impairing competence to consent to treatment. Bulletin of the
American Academy of Psychiatry and Law 19, 383–388.
Carpenter, W. T., Bartko, J. J., Carpenter, C. L. & Strauss, J. S.
(1976). Another view of schizophrenia subtypes : a report from the
International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia. Archives of General
Psychiatry 33, 508–516.
Carson, D. (1993). Disabling Process : The Law Commission’s
proposals on mentally incapacitated adults’ decision-making.
Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 5, 304–320.
Chaplin, R. & Kent, A. (1998). Informing patients about tardive
dyskinesia. Controlled trial of patient education. British Journal of
Psychiatry 172, 78–81.
Creyke, R. (1995). Who Can Decide? Legal Decision-Making for
Others. Australian Government Publishing Service : Canberra.
Department of Health (1993). Community Supervision Orders:
GovernmentResponse to the Fifth Report from the Health Committee
(Session 1992–1993 ). HMSO: London.
Department of Health and Welsh Office (1993). Mental Health Act
1983 Code of Practice. HMSO: London.
Dormer, R. J. (1997). Living wills : the Law. Dispatches 8, 1–3.
Drane, J. F. (1984). Competency to give an informed consent. A
model for making clinical assessments. Journal of the American
Medical Association 272, 925–927.
Freedman, M., Stuss, D. T. & Gordon, M. (1991). Assessment of
competency: the role of neurobehavioral deficits. Annals of Internal
Medicine 115, 203–208.
Glass, K. C. (1997). Redefining definitions and devising instruments :
two decades of assessing mental competence. International Journal
of Law and Psychiatry 20, 5–33.
Goldsmith, M. (1996). Hearing the Voice of People with Dementia.
Jessica Kingsley Publishers : London.
Grisso, T. (1986). Evaluating Competencies: Forensic Assessments
and Instruments. Plenum Press : New York.
Grisso, T. & Appelbaum, P. S. (1991). Mentally ill and non-mentally
ill patients’ abilities to understand informed consent disclosures for
medication. Law and Human Behavior 15, 377–388.
Grisso, T. & Appelbaum, P. S. (1995a). The MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study. III. Abilities of patients to consent to
psychiatric and medical treatments. Law and Human Behavior 19,
149–174.
Grisso, T. & Appelbaum, P. S. (1995b). Comparison of standards for
assessing patients’ capacities to make treatment decisions. Ameri-
can Journal of Psychiatry 152, 1033–1036.
Grisso, T. & Appelbaum, P. S. (1998). Assessing Competence to
Consent to Treatment: A Guide for Physicians and Other Health
Professionals. Oxford University Press : New York.
Grossman, L. & Summers, F. (1980). A study of the capacity of
schizophrenic patients to give informed consent. Hospital and
Community Psychiatry 31, 205–206.
Gunn, M. (1994). The meaning of incapacity. Medical Law Review 2
(Spring), 8–29.
Halpern, A. & Szmukler, G. (1997). Psychiatric advance directives :
reconciling autonomy and non-consensual treatment. Psychiatric
Bulletin 21, 323–327.
Harris, T. (1997). Projections: a look into the future. Social Trends
27, 15–26.
Hoggett, B. (1994). Mentally incapacitated adults and decision-
making. The Law Commission’s project. In Decision-making and
Problems of Incompetence (ed. A. Grubb), pp. 27–40. John Wiley
& Sons: Chichester.
Hollins, S., Bernal, J. & Gregory, M. Illustrated by Webb, B. (1996).
Going to the Doctor. Royal College of Psychiatrists}St George’s
Hospital Medical School : London.
446 J. G. Wong and others
Irwin, M., Lovitz, A., Marder, S. R., Mintz, J., Winslade, W. J., Van
Putten, T. & Mills, M. J. (1985). Psychotic patients’ understanding
of informed consent. American Journal of Psychiatry 142,
1351–1354.
Jones, G. H. (1995). Informed consent in chronic schizophrenia?
British Journal of Psychiatry 167, 565–568.
Jones, M. A. & Keywood, K. (1996). Assessing the patient’s
competence to consent to medical treatment. Medical Law
International 2, 107–147.
Kay, D. W. K. (1991). The epidemiology of dementia : a review of
recent work. Review of Clinical Gerontology 1, 55–66.
Kennedy, I. (1992). Consent to treatment : the capable person. In
Doctors, Patients and the Law (ed. C. Dyer), pp. 44–71. Blackwell
Scientific Publications: Oxford.
Kennedy, I. & Grubb, A. (1994). Medical Law: Text with Materials,
2nd edn. Butterworths ; London.
Kiernan, C. (1985). Communication. In Mental Deficiency: The
Changing Outlook 4th edn (ed. A. M. Clarke, A. D. B. Clarke and
J. M. Berg), pp. 584–638. Methuen: London.
Kopelman, L. M. (1990). On the evaluative nature of competency
and capacity judgements. International Journal of Law and
Psychiatry 13, 309–329.
Law Commission (1991). Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-
Making: An Overview (Consultation Paper No. 119). HMSO:
London.
Law Commission (1995). Mental Incapacity (Law Commission
Report No. 231). HMSO: London,
Lord Chancellor’s Department (1997). Who Decides? Making
Decisions on Behalf of Mentally Incapacitated Adults (Cm 3803).
The Stationery Office: London.
Maguire, C. P., Kirby, M., Coen, R., Coakley, D., Lawlor, B. A. &
O’Neill, D. (1996). Family members’ attitudes toward telling the
patient with Alzheimer’s disease their diagnosis. British Medical
Journal ; 313, 529–560.
Mansell, J. (1997). ‘Better Services ’ 25 years on. Tizard Learning
Disability Review 2 (1), 45–46.
Marson, D. C., Cody, H. A., Ingram, K. K. & Harrell, L. E. (1995a).
Neuropsychologic predictors of competency in Alzheimer’s disease
using a rational reasons legal standard. Archives of Neurology 52,
955–959.
Marson, D. C., Ingram, K. K., Cody, H. A. & Harrell, L. E. (1995b).
Assessing the competency of patients with Alzheimer’s disease
under different legal standards. A prototype instrument. Archives
of Neurology 52, 949–954.
Marson, D. C., Schmitt, F. A., Ingram, K. K. & Harrell, L. E.
(1994). Determining the competency of Alzheimer patients to
consent to treatment and research. Alzheimer Disease and
Associated Disorders 8, (suppl. 4), 5–18.
Morris, C. D., Niederbuhl, J. M. & Mahr, J. M. (1993). Determining
the capability of individuals with mental retardation to give
informed consent. American Journal of Mental Retardation 98,
263–272.
Murphy, G. H. & Clare, I. C. H. (1995). Adults’ capacity to make
decisions affecting the person: psychologists’ contribution. In
Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts (ed. R. Bull and D.
Carson), pp. 97–128. John Wiley & Sons: Chichester.
Ouslander, J., Tymchuk, A. & Rahbar, B. (1989). Health care
decisions among elderly long-term care residents and their potential
proxies. Archives of Internal Medicine 149, 1367–1372.
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research (1983).
Making Health Care Decisions. US Government Printing Office:
Washington, DC.
Rapin, I. (1996). Practitioner review: Developmental language
disorders : a clinical update. Journal of Child Psychology and
Psychiatry 37, 643–655.
Roth, L. H., Miesel, A. & Lidz, C. W. (1977). Tests of competency to
consent to treatment. American Journal of Psychiatry 134, 279–284.
Schachter, D., Kleinman, I., Pendergast, P., Remington, G. &
Schertzer, S. (1994) The effect of psychopathology on the ability of
schizophrenic patients to give informed consent. Journal of Nervous
and Mental Disease 182, 360–362.
Schwartz, H. I. & Blank, K. (1986). Shifting competency during
hospitalisation: a model for informed consent decisions. Hospital
and Community Psychiatry 37, 1256–1260.
Scottish Law Commission (1995). Report on Incapable Adults
(Scottish Law Commission Report No. 151). HMSO: Edinburgh.
Sonnenblick,M., Friedlander, Y. & Steinberg, A. (1993). Dissociation
between the wishes of terminally ill parents and decisions by their
offspring. Journal of American Geriatric Society 41, 599–604.
Sutherby, K. & Szmukler, G. (1998). Crisis cards and self-help crisis
initiatives. Psychiatric Bulletin 22, 4–7.
Tancredi, L. (1982). Competency for informed consent. Conceptual
limits of empirical data. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry
5, 51–63.
Todd, S. & Shearn, J. (1997). Family dilemmas and secrets :
parents’ disclosure of information to their adult offspring with
learning disabilities. Disability and Society 12, 341–366.
Tymchuk, A. J., Ouslander, J. G. & Rader, N. (1986). Informing the
elderly. A comparison of four methods. Journal of the American
Geriatrics Society 34, 818–822.
United Nations (1979). Age and Sex Composition by Country
1960–2000. United Nations: New York.
United Nations (1994). The Standard Rules on the Equalization of
Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities. United Nations: New
York.
Verma, S. & Silberfeld, M. (1997). Approaches to capacity and
competency: the Canadian view. International Journal of Law and
Psychiatry 20, 35–34.
Weisstub, D. (1990). Enquiry on Mental Competency: Final Report.
Queen’s Printer : Toronto.
Wong, J. (1997). Assessment of capacity to make treatment decision
in adults with learning disabilities. Tizard Learning Disability
Review, 2 (3), 35–39.
